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Remittances and Reverse Flows in Developing Countries1
Anupam Das and John Serieux
I. Introduction
The role of remittances has been of increasing interest to researchers and policymakers over the last
decade. This is not surprising in light of the fact that recorded remittance flows to developing countries
doubled in the five years after 2000, and continued to increase through 2008 despite the challenges to the
global economy in that year. Remittance flows to developing countries reached $328 billion in 2008—
15% higher than the 2007 amount of $281 billion.2
A large part of the motivation for much of the recent research has been the possibility that these large and
increasing remittance flows could potentially become an important tool for economic development. A
better understanding of the motivation and effect of these flows would make for better policy formulation
in finding ways to channel more remittance flows into productive investment.3 Research questions have
thus centred on the allocation of remittance receipts within the domestic economy.4
From a macroeconomic perspective, it is widely accepted in the existing literature that remittances generate
output growth either by increasing consumption or by increasing investment.5 Beyond the consumption/
investment choice, academicians and policymakers in recent years have been suggesting a third destination
of remittances—reverse flows. It has been suggested that remittance flows allow developing countries to
maintain adequate foreign reserves6, service debt7 and finance capital flight8. Remittances that are used for
such reverse flows (i.e., debt amortization, reserve accumulation, or capital flight) are no longer available
for consumption or investment, placing a limit on the direct potential growth effect. This last consideration
has not been well recognized or researched in the literature.
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This paper attempts to bridge the gap in the literature by determining, for a sample of remittance-receiving
developing countries, what proportion of remittance flows have historically been diverted to reverse flows.
This is done by first estimating the effect of remittance flows on consumption, investment and net exports,
and then using the estimated magnitude for these (the remittance coefficients in the relevant equations) to
derive estimates of the proportion of remittance flows diverted to reverse flows. This provides an
approximation of the extent to which reverse flows may have constrained the effect of remittance flows on
investment and consumption propensities and their potential effect on growth through these aggregates.
It should be noted that this study deals with the allocation of remittances only from a macroeconomic
perspective. While it is clear that remittances are used only for consumption or savings/investment at the
household level, this is not necessarily the case at the macroeconomic level. The transfer of foreign exchange
from recipients of remittances to other economic agents (as well as crowding out and crowding in effects)
means that the final economy-wide dispensation can be quite different from the microeconomic choices of
remittance recipients. The greater the amount of remittance-based foreign exchange used for financing
reverse flows, the smaller will be the effect that remittances can have on consumption and investment rates
for the macroeconomy. There is no suggestion here that the use of remittances for reverse flows is a purely
negative phenomenon. The argument is that the diversion of remittances towards the financing of reverse
flows affects the degree to which these flows can generate growth by directly boosting investment and
consumption rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical background
of this research. Section 3 uses national income and balance of payments identities to establish the potential
choices in the allocation of remittances and the critical role of reverse flows. Section 4 outlines the methodology
to be used to derive relevant results. Section 5 presents and analyzes those results, and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. The Allocation of Remittance Flows from a Macroeconomic Perspective: A literature review
The role of savings in development is a major focus in the field of development economics. Lewis (1954),
for example, argues that an underdeveloped country begins the process of development when a voluntary
savings rate of 4% to 5% increases to about 12% to 15% of national income. In reality, developing
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countries are often unable to generate the rates of domestic savings that are required for funding the levels
of investment necessary for generating and sustaining rapid growth.9
Theoretically, foreign resource inflows can remove the gap between domestic savings and required investment
by providing needed foreign exchange to developing countries.10 An explicit assumption is that all of foreign
assistance is directed towards investment. As opposed to this strong assumption, Rahman (1967) concludes
that external resources are likely to be used to increase both consumption and investment if the marginal
output-capital ratio is higher than the rate of interest on external borrowing. This is almost certainly true for
aid. Griffin and Enos (1970) goes one step further to show that cheap concessional credit are simply used
as an alternative to more expensive domestic credit, accommodating lower domestic savings while leaving
investment largely unchanged (i.e., foreign aid would mostly cause increased consumption).
Remittances also generate a flow of external resources, and a similar debate regarding the allocation of
these resources has taken place in recent years. Stahl and Habib (1989) and Glytsos (1993) show that
remittances are mostly used for consumption. Through the Keynesian multiplier mechanism, recipient
economies can still benefit in terms of growth if these remittances are used to purchase domestically-
produced goods and services. As opposed to this view, Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) argue that
remittances have been important in generating output growth by increasing investment in countries with less
developed financial sectors. Remittances in those countries have provided an alternative means for financing
investment and reducing liquidity constraints. Their results suggest that inflow of remittances help alleviate
credit constraints in developing countries where credit markets are inefficient or non-existent—thus,
contributing to improving the allocation of capital boosting economic growth.
Beyond the consumption/investment choice, policymakers have often suggested that remittance flows to
developing countries, by boosting foreign exchange receipts, allow them to maintain adequate foreign
reserves11 service debt12 or finance capital flight13. Remittances that are used to finance reverse flows (i.e.,
debt amortization, reserve accumulation, or capital flight) are no longer available for consumption or
investment. That would appear to place a limit on the potential direct growth effect. This last consideration
has not been well recognized or researched in the literature.
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Though the issue of potential resource loss from the diversion of external resource flows to reverse flows
(in the form of debt servicing, reserve accumulation or capital flight) is noted early in the aid literature, it has
largely been ignored until recently. Rahman (1967) observe that the amount of aid available for financing
consumption or investment depends on the aid available after financing debt service payments. Loxley and
Sackey (2008) emphasize the need for Africans to strategize to reduce future dependence on aid, since aid
in the form of concessional loans entail future debt service obligations. Serieux (2010) and Serieux and
Das (2009) show that aid that is used to service debt, finance capital flight or accumulate reserves cannot
contribute directly to either consumption or domestic investment.
To what extent do the challenges of financing reverse flows apply to remittances as well? Loxley and
Sackey (2008) suggest that in the long run some countries need to rely on other financial flows such as
workers’ remittances to overcome the future debt servicing obligations that come with aid in the form of
concessional loans. Though many developing countries carried high debt burdens in an environment of
falling aid flows in the 1980s and 1990s, whether this scenario has indeed come to pass is yet to be
investigated.
The macroeconomic literature on the use of remittances is concerned primarily with the ultimate effect of
remittance flows on growth. Thus, the debate on the allocation of remittances at the macroeconomic level
is focused on the same question that preoccupies the microeconomic literature—whether remittance flows
are used to increase consumption or investment. The nature of the growth effect is presumed to be determined
by that choice. Stahl and Arnold (1986) and Stahl and Habib (1989) show that remittances are mostly
used for consumption and affected growth positively via the consumption multiplier. Brown (1994), Ziesemer
(2006) and Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006) argue that remittances promote growth by promoting investment.
At the macroeconomic level, the relationship between the allocation of remittances and growth is far more
complex than a simple story of investment or consumption. Remittances represent a transfer of foreign
purchasing power from external agents to agents in the domestic economy. When the foreign currency—
in which it is denominated—is exchanged for domestic currency, purchasing power is transferred from
remittance recipients to other domestic agents (via financial institution, the monetary authority or directly).
The degree to which this potential increase in purchasing power is translated into a real increase in absorption
(and not simply increase in the domestic money supply) will depend on the proportion of purchasing power
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abroad that is actually utilized to purchase goods and services. Remittance flows result in a one to one
increase in absorption (and, therefore, consumption and investment propensities) only if all remittance
flows are used to increase imports (expand the trade deficit). If some of this purchasing power is used to
finance reverse flows (reserve accumulation, debt service or capital flight), the effect on investment and
consumption ratios is less than that would be suggested by the size of remittance flows. Therefore, although
remittances are private flows and the microeconomic allocation of remittances is privately determined, the
final economy-wide (macroeconomic) allocation is affected by decisions about how to allocate the implied
foreign exchange receipts.
As noted earlier, it is clear that policymakers from many developing countries see remittance flows as a
potential resource for maintaining healthy reserves at their central banks. It is also very likely that remittance
flows make it easier to finance capital flight because much of it enters the country through informal channels.
Brown (1992a; 1992b) asserts that because of the pervasive presence of informal markets, a significant
amount of migrants’ remittances in Sudan disappears through informal channels. Thus, it seems likely that
reverse flows are an important part of the allocation of remittance flows. In the last three sections of this
paper, an attempt will be made to determine the level of its importance. Preceding this empirical analysis,
it is necessary to clarify the accounting relationships on which the macroeconomic allocation issue is
predicated.
3. Basic Accounting and Allocation of Remittances
The basic national income identity tells us total output is composed of consumption, investment and net
exports. From this identity, a simple derivation (Derivation B1 in Appendix B) shows that the negative of
the net export ratio (the trade deficit) effect of remittances nx
rem
∂⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ is identical to the sum of its investment
rate effect ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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∂
∂
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i
 and the consumption rate effect
c
rem
∂⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠ . Remittances affect the rates of investment and
consumption to the extent that they enable the widening of the trade deficit (increase import) relative to
output. The intuition is that remittance flows can only expand consumption or investment, relative to output,
when the foreign purchasing power inherent in remittance flows is utilized for one of these purposes. The
existing literature, which works on the presumption that remittances are simply allocated between
consumption and investment rates, implicitly assume that all remittance flows are eventually used to expand
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the trade deficit. The proportion of remittances that is used to expand the trade deficit will depend on the
proportion that is used to finance reverse flows.
As Derivation B2 (Appendix B) indicates, whenever remittances are used to finance reverse flows, they
are no longer available for expanding the trade deficit or increasing investment or consumption rates directly.
In this derivation, the current account balance (CU) and the capital account balance (CA) are disaggregated
into their respective components. Remittance flows are transfers; the differential of net transfers with respect
to remittance flows is one. The foreign exchange provided by remittance flows can be used to finance
interest payments on foreign debt (part of net foreign income), principal payments on foreign debt and
reserve accumulation (part of net official flows) and capital flight (part of net private flows). The derivative
of all of these flows with respect to remittance flows is potentially non-zero. Since these flows are outward
(and therefore negative), they compete with net exports for the scarce resource provided by remittance
flows. The larger the effect of remittances on these (reverse) flows, the smaller is the net export effect.
Given the relationship between the trade deficit and consumption and investment ratios, this also implies
that the allocation of remittance flows is fully summarized by its consumption, investment and reverse flow
effects (when these are measured relative to output) (Derivation B3).
4. Methodology
4.1 Estimation Issues
While it is possible, at least theoretically, to estimate the direct effects of remittances on each of the major
types of reverse flows (debt service flows, reserve accumulation and capital flight), there are no generally
established (i.e., theoretically based) behavioural models for debt service flows and reserve accumulation.
Though there are behavioural models for capital flight, time series data for that aggregate is not generally
available. As the previous section indicates, accounting identities allow us to estimate the proportion of
remittance flows directed to reverse flows because it is the residual after the effect of remittance flows on
consumption and investment has been taken into account. It is also the residual once the effect of remittance
flows on net exports has been accounted for. Two ways of approximating the degree to which remittance
flows are diverted to reverse flows are presented. This paper will attempt to derive both of these estimates.
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To that end, consumption, investment and trade balance equations will be estimated and from these estimates
the implied share of reverse flows (in the allocation of remittances) will be derived.
The dataset employed for this research covers 36 countries14 for the period 1980 to 2006. Since the panel
dataset can be categorized as having a large T and large N, the likelihood of non-stationarity of some of the
variables becomes an issue. A primary focus of this paper is the long-run relationship between remittances
and consumption, investment and the trade balance. These challenges (estimating long-run relationships
across a large group of countries and over an extended period of time) can be appropriately addressed
using the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) approach of Pesaran et al. (1999). This is an error-correction
approach specifically designed for panel data with large T and large N, where non-stationarity is a concern.
The PMG approach estimates a single, cointegrating, long-run equation for the full panel but panel-specific
short-run equations. This procedure requires an assumption of homogeneity of the long-run coefficients
across panels (countries). This approach is restrictive relative to the Mean Group (MG) approach which
allows for individual (panel-specific) long and short-run relationships. Pesaran et al. (1999) argues that the
high degree of sensitivity of MG estimates to outliers, measurement errors and omitted variables at the
panel level make the PMG approach preferable, even if the assumption of homogeneity of long-run coefficients
may not be valid. Our estimation results suggest that the significant efficiency gains in the PMG approach
over the MG approach in this context justifies this additional assumption.
To determine the level of integration of the (dependent and potential explanatory) variables, we employed
Hadri’s panel stationarity test15 to relevant variables. The null hypothesis of full panel stationarity is rejected
for all but one variable—the innovation in export growth (See Table 1). In effect, all but one of these
variables appears to be mostly non-stationary at the panel level. Applying the same tests to the first differences
of these variables leads to non-rejection of the null of stationarity. We can, therefore, conclude that these
variables are mostly integrated of order one [I(1)]—meaning that a long-run cointegrating relationship may
exist among the levels of these variables (with the exception of the innovation in export growth which
would be related to short-run adjustments). The first difference of the dependency ratio at the overall panel
level is found to be non-stationary. A more detailed examination of the unit root test (KPSS test16) of this
variable at the panel (country) level is applied. Results from this test suggest that the first difference of the
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dependency ratio could be considered as a stationary variable since the null of stationarity is not rejected
for 27 out of 36 countries.
Table 1: Stationarity Tests for Relevant Variables
Hadri Panel Stationarity Test
Variable (null of stationarity)
Level Difference
Consumption/GDP 45.79*** -2.85
Per Capita Income (Atlas) 80.98*** 1.46
Dependency Ratio 89.93*** 69.57***
Innovation in Export Growth -2.81 -
Private Capital Flows/GDP 18.67*** -3.71
ODA/GDP 18.70*** -4.97
Remittances/GDP 48.10*** 0.62
Investment/GDP 38.01*** -1.72
Total External Debt /GDP 35.69*** 0.84
Rate of Inflation 18.15*** -4.98
Per Capita Income (Constant) 89.09*** 0.93
Index of Real Exchange Rate 40.82*** -2.20
Trade Balance/GDP 35.13*** -2.85
Index of OECD income to Domestic Income Ratio 41.57*** 1.14
Index of Relative Price 34.76*** -2.41
Reserves/GDP 52.72*** 1.25
Note: ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
4.2 The Behavioural Equations
4.2.1 The Consumption Function
The consumption function estimated in this study is a combination of the life-cycle/permanent income
hypothesis and the subsistence income model. While the permanent income model and the life-cycle model
provide invaluable insights into consumption behaviour in both developed and developing countries by
arguing that individuals attempt to smooth consumption over their lifetime17, these models do not suggest a
role for per capita income in the determination of consumption. That variable has been shown to have a
strong relationship with the rate of savings (and, therefore, consumption) in developing countries.18 The
subsistence income model does provide a justification for including per capita income in the equation for
consumption. The thesis argues that below a certain level of income the need to use all income to meet
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basic subsistence levels of consumption constrains or precludes savings.19 In low- and middle-income
countries, as per capita income goes up and some households are released from this (subsistence
consumption) constraint, the rate of consumption falls as the savings rate increases. Given that all of the
countries in this sample are low- or middle-income countries, it is appropriate to include (the log of) per
capita income in the long-run equation (and its rate of growth in the short-run equation).
According to this specification, the ratio of consumption to income has a long-run (equilibrium) relationship
with per capita income, the dependency ratio, the private capital flows to GDP ratio, the foreign aid or
official development assistance (ODA) to GDP ratio, and the remittance flow to GDP ratio (Table 2). The
innovation in export growth as a proxy for transitory income is presumed to affect short-run consumption
decisions and is part of the short-run dynamics within the error correction framework. This variable is
measured as the difference between the current rate of export growth and the average export growth rate
of the previous three years.
Table 2: The Determinants of the Rate of Consumption
Variables Relevance Expected Sign of
Coefficient
Log of per capita income20
Related to the proportion of the
population above subsistence
Negative
Innovation in exports growth Increase in perceived transitory income Negative
The dependency ratio Effect on population structure on consumption Positive
Remittances/GDP
Increased access to resources beyond that derived from
domestic output with limited or no future repayment burdens To be determined
Private capital flows/GDP
Increased access to private resources with significant
future repayment burdens
Positive
ODA/GDP
Increased access to resources beyond that derived from
domestic output with limited future repayment burdens
Positive
4.2.2 The Investment Function
The specification for the investment equation is motivated by the flexible accelerator model of investment.
A modified version of this model is presented in this essay to accommodate the impact of remittances on
the investment rate. Total external debt to GDP ratio and per capita income are assumed to affect the
desired capital stock. Remittances to GDP ratio, private capital to GDP ratio and ODA to GDP ratio are
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assumed to affect the rate at which the gap between desired and actual capital stock is bridged. The rate
of inflation and the real exchange rate index are assumed to affect both the desired capital stock as well as
the rate at which actual capital stock reaches its desired level. All variables are presumed to enter the long-
run (cointegrating) equation in levels and the short-run equation in first-difference form.
Table 3: Determinants of the Rate of Investment
Variables Relevance Expected Sign of
Coefficient
Total external debt/GDP Import compression and debt-related disincentive effects Negative
Log of rate of inflation Proxy for macroeconomic instability Negative
Per capita income Affects profitability and, therefore, the rate of return on capital Positive
Index of real exchange rate A depreciation (increase in the index) improves the
competitiveness of domestically produced goods Positive
Remittances/GDP Increased access to resources beyond that derived from
domestic output Zero or positive
Private capital flows/GDP Direct contributions of commercial credit for investment Positive
ODA/GDP Increased access to resources beyond that derived from
domestic output Zero or Positive
4.2.3 The Net Export Function
The net export or the trade balance equation employed in this paper is a combination of the gross export
equation and the import equation. The traditional import equation employed in the developed country
context suggests that imports are determined by domestic output and relative prices. However, the underlying
presumption that the market for imports (and foreign exchange) clear is not very tenable in developing
countries and, not surprisingly, this simple model has not performed well for developing countries.21 Hemphil
(1974) suggests an approach that assumes foreign exchange is rationed and imports are constrained by
foreign exchange availability. Availability of foreign exchange reserves becomes explicit determinant of
imports in Hemphil’s model. This model has performed better for developing countries. Moran (1989)
proposes a more generalized version where imports are determined by the price and income variables as
well as the foreign exchange variables. In our present study, this generalized import equation by Moran is
combined with the traditional export equation (which suggests that exports are determined by the income
of export-destination countries and the real exchange rate) to estimate the net exports or trade balance
equation.
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Table 4 explains the variables that enter the net exports equation. The dependent variable is net exports (or
the trade balance) relative to GDP (rather than simply the value of net exports). The relevant foreign
income variable is the ratio of foreign income to domestic income rather than the level of that variable. The
index of OECD income to domestic income is used to capture the impact of foreign income. The index of
relative prices is calculated as the ratio of the export price index of advanced economies and the domestic
price index of each country. The determinants of foreign exchange availability are foreign exchange reserves
to GDP ratio, remittances to GDP ratio, private capital flows to GDP ratio, and ODA to GDP ratio. All
variables enter the long-run equation in levels and the short-run equation in differenced form.
Table 4: Determinants of Net exports
Variables Relevant Effect
Expected Sign of
Coefficient
OECD income to domestic
Affects the demand for net exports Positive
income index
Index of relative prices Affects the demand for imports and supply of exports Positive
Foreign exchange reserves/GDP Influences the feasible supply of imports Negative
Remittances/GDP Influences the feasible supply of imports Negative
Private capital flows/GDP Influences the feasible supply of imports Negative
ODA/GDP Influences the feasible supply of imports Negative
4.3 Data Issues
It has already been noted that the models specified above would be estimated using a panel dataset for 36
developing countries from all regions of the world and covering the period 1980 to 2006. During 1980-
2006, average remittance flows as a percentage of GDP for these countries  were in the range of
approximately half of one per cent to ten per cent. Other labour-exporting countries that were possible
candidates to be incorporated in our dataset included Jordan and Lesotho. The average ratio of remittance
flows to GDP for Jordan and Lesotho over the specified period was close to 20% and 53% respectively.
We presume that countries with such high receipts may behave differently from those with low receipts.
The relevant tests indicate that the coefficients are not similar to the coefficients of our general equations.
The data sources for the variables used in this investigation were: the Global Development Finance and the
World Development Indicators by the World Bank; the International Financial Statistics by the International
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Monetary Fund; UNDATA by the United Nations; and OECD Online Library of Statistical Database by
the OECD.
5. Results and Analysis
Results from the PMG estimates of consumption, investment and net exports functions are presented in
Tables C1, C2 and C3 of Appendix C. To check the consistency of PMG estimates, we tested it against
the MG estimates. These results are also presented in the same tables. While theoretically, MG estimates
are always consistent, as suggested by Pesaran et al. (1999), they are very sensitive to outliers and errors-
in-variables and, thus, the coefficients from MG estimates are often large and insignificant. The presumed
consistency of the MG estimator allows us to test for the consistency of the PMG estimator by employing
the Hausman Test (which tests the null hypothesis that the MG and PMG coefficients are not systematically
different against the alternative that they are). If the null is not rejected, the PMG estimator can be presumed
consistent. Pesaran et al. (1999) note this test is weak; but this must be juxtaposed against the extreme
sensitivity of the MG estimator (to extreme values and measurement errors). They suggest that the PMG
estimator may provide better estimates of mean (long-run) coefficient values even when the underlying
assumption of common coefficients is not valid. This allows for a great deal more comfort with the results
of the Hausman Tests, which is one of the factors used in choosing the final specification (in terms of the
number of short-run lags).22
The PMG estimators of the consumption equation (Appendix C, Table C1) indicate that most of the long-
run variables (i.e., dependency ratio, non-concessional capital flows to GDP ratio, ODA to GDP ratio, and
remittances to GDP ratio) have significant impact on the rate of consumption. The coefficient for private
capital flows (i.e., the non-concessional capital flows to GDP ratio) is surprisingly negative and significant.
Moreover, this result is robust to changes in the (short- or long-run) specifications of the consumption
equation.23 Thus, on average, non-concessional capital flows in these developing countries displace
consumption and increase the domestic savings rate.
The error-correction term from the PMG estimator is strongly significant but most of the (differenced)
variables in the short-run equation are not significant. The exceptions are the constant term (which averages
the country-specific fixed effects) and the innovation in export growth. The negative coefficient for the
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innovation in export growth supports the presumption of the Permanent Income Hypothesis that short-run
consumption rates are strongly and negatively responsive to changes in transitory income (as savings rates
increase).
The coefficient for remittances to GDP ratio, our main variable of interest, is 0.80. It is significantly positive
(at better than 1% level) suggesting that, on average, each additional dollar of increased remittances is used
to increase consumption by 80 cents. In a similar manner, a positive and significant ODA-to-GDP ratio
coefficient (0.65) suggests that approximately 65% of official assistance is used to increase consumption.
It should be noted that although the signs of ODA/GDP and Remittance/GDP coefficients are persistently
positive regardless of the specification, the magnitude of these coefficients are quite sensitive to the equation
specification (in terms of the number of lags in the short-run equation). Our confidence in this result will
have to rest in part on the results for the net export equation which indirectly includes the consumption
effect.
To determine whether non-market financial flows (i.e., ODA and remittances) have similar effects on the
consumption rate, we employed the Wald Test. This test does not reject the null hypothesis that these two
coefficients are indistinguishable. This result suggests that, on average, remittances and ODA had similar
effects on the rate of consumption in this set of developing countries during the period from 1980 to 2006.
The PMG estimates of the investment rate equation are presented in Table C2. These results are robust to
changes in the specifications of the equation. The long-run PMG coefficient estimates suggest that the
investment rate is influenced negatively by the debt-to-GDP ratio and the rate of inflation, and positively by
the index of the real exchange rate and non-concessional capital flows. Coefficients for both the ODA-to-
GDP ratio and remittances-to-GDP ratio are found to be insignificant. Implications are that over the long
run, changes in the ODA/GDP ratio and the remittances/GDP ratio have no significant impact on the
investment rate in these countries.
It is clear from the above results that, on average, any increase in foreign aid and remittances (as a percentage
of GDP) in these 36 developing countries lead to significant and large increases in the rate of consumption
but no substantial change in the investment rates. This result (that remittances are used mostly for consumption
in developing countries) is similar to the results reported by Stahl and Arnold (1986) and Stahl and Habib
(1989).
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The general results from the estimation of the net export equation are presented in Table C3. Results
obtained from the long-run estimation indicate that the trade balance has a negative and statistically significant
relationship with the (lagged) foreign reserves/GDP ratio, the ODA/GDP ratio and the remittances/GDP
ratio, and a positive and significant relationship with the index of foreign income to domestic income
(calculated as OECD income/domestic income ratio) as anticipated. The coefficient for the index of relative
price is found to be significant but did not have the expected sign. This result is likely an indication of an
inelastic response to import prices24, which causes import expenditure to move with the price of imports
causing the trade balance to deteriorate (hence the negative sign).
The negative coefficient for remittances/GDP ratio suggests that an increase in the flow of remittances
tends to cause a deterioration of the trade balance. An increase in remittances as a share of GDP results in
increased purchases of foreign goods and services (at least in relative terms). The coefficient of negative
0.73 does not suggest a one-to-one relationship between the remittances/GDP ratio and net exports/GDP
ratio. Instead, it suggests that a one dollar increase in the flow of remittances tends to expand the trade
deficit by only 73 cents. Similarly, a negative (-0.70) ODA/GDP ratio suggests that, on an average, a one
dollar increase in the amount of foreign aid flowing to these countries increases their trade deficit by 70
cents. These results are supported by the Wald Tests (Table C3), which strongly reject the null hypothesis
that these coefficients are indistinguishable from minus one.
The actual amount of remittances that is diverted to reverse flows is derived and presented in Table C4.
When the reverse flow effect is estimated as a residual after the consumption and investment effects have
been accounted for, the estimated value is 0.20. When the reverse flow effect is calculated as a residual
after the net exports effect has been accounted for, the estimated value is also 0.27. To find out if these two
coefficients can be treated as estimates of a common (true) value, we again employ the Wald test (Table
C4). This test does not reject the null hypothesis that the difference between these two estimates is zero. It
can be argued based on the above analysis that a positive (non-zero) proportion of remittances is used to
finance reverse flows and that this proportion is in the neighbourhood of 20% to 27% for these 36 developing
countries (over the period of 1980 to 2006). It can also be argued that the proportion of ODA and
remittance flows directed to reverse flows are very similar (i.e., not statistically different) for this group of
countries.
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When countries are disaggregated according to their average level of debt service to GDP ratio25, results
from the net export equation (presented in Table C5, Appendix C) suggest that the only dummy which is
positive and significant (at 10% level) in the short-run equation is the dummy for countries with high level of
average debt service to GDP ratio. Dummies for medium and low level of average debt service to GDP
ratio are insignificant. The significantly positive coefficient for this dummy suggests that movements in the
trade balance tend to be more biased in favour of a surplus (or smaller deficit) than is the case for the other
countries. This result lends support to the hypothesis that, in countries with high debt service payments
relative to income, the short-term response of the trade balance is biased in favour of a surplus even when
changes in foreign and domestic income, relative prices and foreign exchange availability and deviation
from long-term equilibrium conditions are taken into account. This behaviour is consistent with pressures
imposed by debt service obligations.
Estimated correlation coefficients for the first difference of the remittances-GDP ratio and the first difference
of the debt service-GDP ratio (for individual countries) are presented in Table C6. Notably, only eleven
out of the 36 countries had correlation coefficients that were negative. More importantly, of the seven
correlation coefficient estimates that were significant (at least at the 10 per cent level) all were positive. This
suggests that for some countries, an increase in remittance flows is (statistically) correlated with an increase
in debt service payments while the opposite is never true. The country type, in terms of debt service
burden, does not seem to matter. This type of result is consistent with the situation where many countries
use remittance flows to finance debt service payments, as suggested above.
We further examine the reverse flow-remittance relationship by disaggregating countries according to the
rate of growth in the foreign reserves to GDP ratio and adding dummy variables for these groups to the
short-run trade balance equation.26 The results are reported in Table C7. None of the dummies for country
groups were found to be significant. This suggests that reserve accumulation is not consistent with any
additional bias in favour of trade surpluses once changes in domestic and foreign income, relative price,
foreign exchange availability and deviation from long-run equilibrium have been taken into account. This
may be due to the fact that unlike debt service obligations reserve accumulation is more discretionary.
The estimated correlation coefficients (presented in Table C8) for changes in the remittances/GDP ratio
and change in the reserves/GDP ratio are overwhelmingly positive (27 out of 36), and of the 14 that are
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statistically significant (at the 10% level or better) only one is negative. Of the 14 significant coefficients, 12
are for countries that demonstrated high or medium rates of reserve accumulation during the sample period
(1976 to 2006).27 These results are consistent with the situation where countries divert remittance receipts
to reverse flows such as reserve accumulation.
6. Conclusion
The relatively rapid rise in remittance flows in developing countries in recent years indicates that these
flows have the potential to become an important tool for economic development. A better understanding of
the macroeconomic effect of remittances can help policymakers to develop policies and design institutions
that ensure that these external resources are used optimally given country objectives. To date, research
questions have generally centred on the allocation of remittance receipts within the domestic economy.28
While the existing economic literature suggests that remittance flows are either used to increase consumption
or investment, policymakers have often argued that a significant portion of remittance flows to developing
countries are used to service debt, increase foreign exchange reserves and finance capital flight. Remittance
flows that are diverted to these ‘reverse flows’ cannot contribute to increased consumption or investment
within the domestic economy (at least not directly). Consumption and investment do not necessarily constitute
the summation of the allocation of remittances. It is likely that part of remittance flows are diverted to
reverse flows and never add to the domestic rates of consumption or investment.
This paper first sought to demonstrate the relationship between remittance flows and consumption, investment
and reverse flows (at the macroeconomic level) by utilizing some basic national accounting and balance of
payment identities. By also estimating consumption, investment and trade balance equations, estimates of
the marginal effect of remittances on reverse flows were derived.
The marginal effects of remittance flows on the rate of consumption, investment and net exports for 36
developing countries (over the period of 1980 to 2006) were found to be 80%, 0% and 73% respectively.
In effect, a one percentage increase in the rate of remittance flows increased the rate of consumption by
roughly 0.8%, expanded the trade balance/GDP ratio by roughly 0.73% and had no statistically discernable
effect on the rate of investment. These results suggest that approximately 20% to 27% of remittance flows
have been diverted to finance reverse flows. The hypothesis that this proportion is zero was very strongly
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rejected. Changes in the rate of remittance flows tended to be positively correlated with changes in debt
service payment-to-income ratios and the rate of reserve accumulation relative to income. Many of the
correlation estimates were also statistically significant. For this group of countries, the summary distribution
of remittances at the macroeconomic level was not only dominated by consumption but also included
reverse flows. This investigation also found that the proportion of remittance flows used to finance reverse
flows was not very different (statistically speaking) from the proportion of aid flows used for the same
purpose.
18
THE IDEAs WORKING PAPER SERIES 02/2010
Appendices
Appendix A
Table A1: List of the Countries in the Sample
Number Country Region
1 Algeria Middle East and North Africa
2 Bangladesh South Asia
3 Benin Sub-Saharan Africa
4 Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa
5 Burkina Fuso Sub-Saharan Africa
6 Colombia Latin America and the Caribbean
7 Costa Rica Latin America and the Caribbean
8 Cote d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa
9 Dominican Republic Latin America and the Caribbean
10 Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East and North Africa
11 El Salvador Latin America and the Caribbean
12 Fiji East Asia and Pacific
13 Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa
14 Guatemala Latin America and the Caribbean
15 Haiti Latin America and the Caribbean
16 Honduras Latin America and the Caribbean
17 India South Asia
18 Indonesia East Asia and Pacific
19 Jamaica Latin America and the Caribbean
20 Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa
21 Malaysia East Asia and Pacific
22 Mali Sub-Saharan Africa
23 Mexico Latin America and the Caribbean
24 Morocco Middle East and North Africa
25 Niger Sub-Saharan Africa
26 Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa
27 Pakistan South Asia
28 Panama Latin America and the Caribbean
29 Philippines East Asia and Pacific
30 Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa
31 Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa
32 Sri Lanka South Asia
33 Swaziland Sub-Saharan Africa
34 Thailand East Asia and Pacific
35 Togo Sub-Saharan Africa
36 Tunisia Middle East and North Africa
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Appendix C
Table C1: MG and PMG Estimates of the Consumption Equation (1980-2006)
Dependent Variable: The Consumption Rate
Explanatory Variables
Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Long-Run Coefficients
Log of Per Capita Income 0.054 -0.011
(0.64) (-1.55)
Dependency Ratio 0.473 0.157
***
(0.89) (3.93)
Private Capital Flows/GDP -1.484 -0.265
***
(-1.22) (-2.97)
ODA/GDP 33.295 0.653
***
(1.25) (12.59)
Remittances/GDP 1.930 0.802
***
(0.77) (8.32)
Short-Run Coefficients
Error Correction Coefficient -0.748
*** -0.338***
(-9.61) (-6.36)
∆ Log of Per Capita Income 0.035 0.000(1.01) (0.02)
∆ Dependency Ratio -1.706 -0.015(-0.51) (-0.02)
Innovation in Export Growth -0.032
* -0.041***
(-1.94) (-3.43)
∆ Innovation in Export Growth 0.005 0.010(0.64) (1.39)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP 0.086 0.087(0.65) (1.62)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Lagged) 0.046 0.069(0.46) (1.67)
∆ ODA/GDP -0.932 0.440(-0.67) (1.11)
∆ ODA/GDP (Lagged) -0.068 -0.131(-0.08) (-0.27)
∆ Remittances/GDP -0.485 -0.125(-0.52) (-0.33)
∆ Remittances/GDP (Lagged) 0.529 0.198
(0.65) (0.59)
Constant 0.766
** 0.233***
(2.14) (6.16)
Number of Observations 954 954
Hausman Test: χ2 Coefficient 1.67
H0: Common coefficients (MG and PMG) Tail Probability 0.893
Wald Test: χ2 Coefficient 1.69
H0: Equality of remittances and ODA coefficients Tail Probability 0.193
Notes: ***, ** and * Indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Figures in brackets are z-statistics.
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Table C2: MG and PMG Estimates of the Investment Equation (1980-2006)
Dependent Variable: Investment/GDP
Explanatory Variables Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Long-Run Coefficients
Total External Debt/GDP -0.149
*** -0.051***
(-2.81) (-5.15)
Log of Inflation Rate -0.227 -0.169
***
(-1.49) (8.45)
Real Exchange Rate Index 0.115
* 0.039***
(1.82) (4.85)
Private Capital Flows/GDP 0.439
** 0.363***
(2.22) (5.94)
ODA/GDP -5.306 -0.032
(-0.68) (-1.00)
Remittances/GDP 0.429 0.026
(0.48) (0.77)
Short-Run Coefficients
Error Correction Coefficient -0.708
*** -0.323***
(-10.59) (-7.03)
∆ Total External Debt/GDP 0.114 0.031
(1.43) (0.72)
∆ Log of Per Capita Income (Lagged) 0.204
*** 0.210***
(2.88) (4.21)
∆ Log of Per Capita Income (Second Lagged) 0.097 -0.010
(1.45) (-0.23)
∆ Log of Inflation Rate -0.018 -0.027
(-0.41) (-1.11)
∆ Real Exchange Rate Index -0.013 -0.012
(-0.36) (-0.48)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.195*** -0.032
(-2.64) (-0.65)
∆ ODA/GDP -0.867 0.102
(-0.97) (0.33)
∆ Remittances/GDP -0.299 0.590
(-0.47) (1.31)
∆ Remittances/GDP (Lagged) -0.337 0.439
*
(-0.69) (1.68)
Constant 0.142
*** 0.059***
(4.32) (6.98)
Number of Observations 961 961
Hausman Test: χ2 Coefficient 6.04
H0:Common coefficients (MG and PMG) Tail Probability 0.419
Notes: ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Figures in brackets are z-
statistics.
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Table C3: MG and PMG Estimates of the Net Export Equation (1980-2006)
Dependent Variable: The Trade Balance/GDP
Explanatory Variables Mean Group Pooled Mean Group
Long-Run Coefficients
OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index 0.019 0.054
***
(0.21) (4.84)
Index of Relative Prices 0.156 -0.038
***
(0.80) (-4.55)
Foreign Reserves/GDP (Lagged) -0.343* -0.225
***
(-1.93) (-3.95)
Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.431 -0.031(-1.10) (-0.44)
ODA/GDP -11.425 -0.703
***
(-1.10) (-6.38)
Remittances/GDP -0.771 -0.730
***
(-0.46) (-11.78)
Error Correction Coefficient -0.909
*** -0.319***
(-13.48) (-7.59)
∆ OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index 0.054 0.088
**
(1.15) (2.12)
∆ OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index (Lagged) -0.004 0.018(-0.14) (0.49)
∆ Index of Relative Prices 0.025 -0.001(1.09) (-0.06)
∆ Foreign Reserves/GDP (Lagged) 0.150 -0.167
**
(1.58) (-2.01)
∆ Foreign Reserves/GDP (Second Lagged) 0.006 -0.030(0.10) (-0.67)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.113 -0.222
***
(-0.78) (-3.58)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Lagged) -0.117 -0.151
**
(-1.19) (-1.99)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Second Lagged) -0.028 -0.023(-0.47) (-0.44)
∆ ODA/GDP 0.206 -1.052(0.23) (-1.05)
∆ Remittances/GDP -0.644 -0.204(-1.01) (-0.78)
Constant -0.005 0.005(-0.17) (1.45)
Number of Observations 962 962
Hausman Test: χ2 Coefficient 10.37
H0: Similar Coefficient Estimates (MG and PMG) Tail Probability 0.110
Wald Test: χ2 Coefficient 18.91***
(Remittance/GDP coefficient = -1) Tail Probability 0.000
Wald Test: χ2 Coefficient 7.28***
(ODA/GDP coefficient = -1) Tail Probability 0.007
Notes: ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Figures in brackets are z-
statistics.
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Table C4: Estimates of Marginal Allocation of Remittances to Reverse Flows (1980-2006)
The Marginal Allocation of Total Remittances to
Variables Coefficient
Consumption 0.80
Investment Insignificant
Reverse Flows 0.20
[1- (Consumption + Investment)]
The Trade Deficit 0.73
Reverse Flows 0.27
[1 - Trade Deficit]
Wald Test: χ2 Coefficient 1.26
H0: Equality of Coefficient Estimates Tail Probability 0.262
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Table C5: PMG Estimates of the Net Export Equation with Debt Service Dummies (1980-2006)
Dependent Variable: The Trade Balance/GDP
Explanatory Variables Long-Run Coefficients
OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index 0.054
***
(4.84)
Index of Relative Prices -0.038
***
(-4.55)
Foreign Reserves/GDP (Lagged) -0.225
***
(-3.95)
Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.031
(-0.44)
ODA/GDP -0.703
***
(-6.38)
Remittances/GDP -0.730
***
(-11.78)
Short-Run Coefficients
Error Correction Coefficient -0.319
***
(-7.59)
∆ OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index 0.088
**
(2.12)
∆ OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index (Lagged) 0.018
(0.49)
∆ Index of Relative Prices -0.001
(-0.06)
∆ Foreign Reserves/GDP (Lagged) -0.167
**
(-2.01)
Long-Run Coefficients
∆ Foreign Reserves/GDP (Second Lagged) -0.030
(-0.67)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.222
***
(-3.58)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Lagged) -0.151
**
(-1.99)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Second Lagged) -0.023
(-0.44)
∆ ODA/GDP -1.052
(-1.05)
∆ Remittances/GDP -0.204
(-0.78)
Dummy for Countries with High Debt Service Payments 0.002
*
(1.67)
Dummy for Countries with Medium Debt Service Payments 0.002
(1.25)
Dummy for Countries with Low Debt Service Payments -0.000
(-0.02)
Number of Observations 962
Notes: ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Figures in brackets are z-
statistics.
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Table C6: Correlation Coefficients between Remittances/GDP and Debt
Service Payments/GDP (1976 -2006)
Country Type According to Average Correlation Significance
Debt Service Payments Coefficient Level
Algeria High 0.26
Bangladesh Low 0.00
Benin Low 0.06
Botswana Low -0.24
Burkina Fuso Low 0.30 *
Colombia Medium 0.52 ***
Costa Rica Medium -0.01
Cote d’Ivoire High 0.34 *
Dominican Republic Medium 0.48 ***
Egypt, Arab Rep. Medium 0.06
El Salvador Medium 0.18
Fiji Medium -0.02
Gambia, The Medium 0.19
Guatemala Low -0.06
Haiti Low 0.25
Honduras Medium -0.04
India Low 0.07
Indonesia Medium 0.32
Jamaica High 0.18
Kenya Medium 0.06
Malaysia Medium 0.14
Mali Medium 0.51 ***
Mexico Medium 0.16
Morocco Medium 0.02
Niger Medium -0.03
Nigeria Medium -0.31
Pakistan Medium 0.33 *
Panama High -0.01
Philippines Medium -0.09
Rwanda Low 0.35 *
Senegal Medium -0.01
Sri Lanka Medium 0.15
Swaziland Medium 0.29
Thailand Medium -0.06
Togo Medium 0.11
Tunisia Medium 0.23
Notes: 1) A country is considered high (low) type when the average value of debt service to GDP is higher
    (lower) than the absolute value. Any country otherwise is medium.
2) ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table C7: PMG Estimates of the Net Export Equation with
Reserve Growth Dummies (1980-2006)
Dependent Variable: The Trade Balance/GDP
Explanatory Variables Long-Run Coefficients
OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index 0.054
***
(4.84)
Index of Relative Prices -0.038
***
(-4.55)
Foreign Reserves/GDP (Lagged) -0.225
***
(-3.95)
Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.031
(-0.44)
ODA/GDP -0.703
***
(- 6.38)
Remittances/GDP -0.730
***
(-11.78)
Short-Run Coefficients
Error Correction Coefficient -0.319
***
(-7.59)
∆ OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index 0.088
**
(2.12)
∆ OECD Income-Domestic Income Ratio Index (Lagged) 0.018
(0.49)
∆ Index of Relative Prices -0.001
(-0.06)
∆ Foreign Reserves/GDP (Lagged) -0.167
**
(-2.01)
∆ Foreign Reserves/GDP (Second Lagged) -0.030
(-0.67)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP -0.222
***
(-3.58)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Lagged) -0.151
**
(-1.99)
∆ Private Capital Flows/GDP (Second Lagged) -0.023
(-0.44)
∆ ODA/GDP -1.052
(-1.05)
∆ Remittances/GDP -0.204
(-0.78)
Dummy for Countries with High Growth in Reserves/GDP 0.001
(0.84)
Dummy for Countries with Medium Growth in Reserves/GDP 0.002
(0.89)
Dummy for Countries with Low Growth in Reserves/GDP 0.002
(0.81)
Number of Observations 962
Notes: ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Figures in brackets are z-
statistics.
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Table C8: Correlation Coefficients between Remittances/GDP and
Growth of Reserves/GDP (1976-2006)
Country Rate of Growth Correlation Significance
in Reserves Coefficient Level
Algeria Medium 0.18
Bangladesh Medium 0.34 *
Benin High 0.33 *
Botswana Low -0.17
Burkina Fuso Medium 0.19
Colombia Low 0.38 **
Costa Rica Medium 0.18
Cote d’Ivoire High 0.12
Dominican Republic High 0.03
Egypt, Arab Rep. Medium 0.40 **
El Salvador Medium 0.03
Fiji Low -0.07
Gambia, The High -0.40 **
Guatemala Medium 0.03
Haiti High -0.09
Honduras Medium 0.31 *
India Medium 0.23
Indonesia Medium 0.38 *
Jamaica Medium 0.49 **
Kenya High -0.17
Malaysia Medium 0.09
Mali Medium -0.06
Mexico High 0.33 *
Morocco Medium 0.39 **
Niger Medium 0.08
Nigeria Medium 0.33 *
Pakistan Medium 0.58 ***
Panama Medium 0.14
Philippines Medium -0.29
Rwanda Medium 0.18
Senegal Low 0.29
Sri Lanka Low -0.21
Swaziland Low 0.35 **
Thailand Medium -0.22
Togo Medium 0.11
Tunisia Medium 0.38 **
Notes: 1) A country is considered high (low) type when the average value of debt service to GDP is higher (lower)
    than the absolute value. Any country otherwise is medium.
2) ***, ** and * Indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Notes
1 The authors are grateful to John Loxley, Radhika Desai and Dane Rowlands for their valuable comments.
2 See Ratha et al. (2009).
3 See Chami et al. (2003).
4 See Adams, Jr. (1991: 695).
5 See Stahl and Habib (1989); Glytsos (1993); Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2006).
6 See Bdnews24 (2009a); Bdnews24 (2009b); Bdnews24 (2009c); Amjad (2004), Joshi and Sanyal (2004).
7 See Ratha (2007).
8 See Brown (1992a; 1992b).
9 See McGuire (1994).
10 See Chenery and Strout (1966).
11 See Bdnews24 (2009b); Bdnews24 (2009c); Amjad (2004); Joshi and Sanyal (2004).
12 See Ratha (2007).
13 See Brown (1992a; 1992b).
14 See Table A1 (in Appendix A) for the list of countries.
15 See Hadri (2002).
16 This test was suggested by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).
17 See Friedman (1957); Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).
18 See Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1997).
19 See Ogaki et al. (1996).
20 Per capita income (in $US) is logged to reflect the presumption that the relationship is non-linear.
21 See Mirakhor and Montiel (1987); Moran (1989).
22 The other factor used is the significance of lagged differenced variables. Additional lags are not added to differenced
variables in the short-run equation if the last lag of that variable is not statistically significant (at the 10 per cent
level or better) and the Hausman Test does not reject the null of consistent estimates. However, in some cases, the
adding of a lag to the differenced variable cause a failure to converge in the likelihood estimate (i.e., the error
correction model fails). In this case, no additional lags are added even if the contemporaneous differenced variable
(or the first lag) is significant.
23 We experimented with different specifications such as more parsimonious long-run equations (such as removing
the dependency variable), modification of the definitions of some variables (defining private flows separately from
public flows) and changing the number of lags in the short-run equation.
24 As reported by Oteng-Abayie and Frimpong (2008) for Ghana, for example.
25 Dummies represent the average of the absolute value of the deviation. These dummies enter in the short-run net
exports equation. We are thus able to demonstrate if these dummies have different intercepts in the net exports
equation.
26 Three dummies are used (based on the average of the absolute value of the deviation) to represent countries with
high, medium and low reserves to GDP ratio. These dummies enter in the short-run net exports equation so that we
can examine if these dummies have different intercepts in the net exports equation.
27 The sample period for the correlations is longer than the sample period for the regressions because there are fewer
restrictions from data availability.
28 Adams, Jr., (1991: 695).
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